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Contributing to our understanding of ideas as power resources in union struggle, this
article analyses a labour dispute in Israel’s shipping industry. The article follows the
union’s foregrounding of a specific idea of the state contained within the collective un-
derstanding of Israel’s history, by which the union legitimised its position in the dis-
pute and significantly influenced a government decision. The article therefore
suggests that ideas can be an important power resource, particularly when other
power resources are lacking but that this power resource is dependent on the specific
ideational context: effective foregrounded ideas draw on a shared narrative that en-
ables political actors to claim the moral high ground, while accusing their adversaries
of failing to fulfil their moral obligations as understood via the frame of that shared
narrative.
1 INTRODUCTION
There has been increasing acknowledgement or rediscovery of the role of ideas in
shaping the ‘form, dynamics and products of the employment relationship’
(Hauptmeier and Heery, 2014: 2473), as well as recognition of the complexity in the
ways ‘ideas matter’. Scholars have explored the role of ideologies and beliefs in shap-
ing responses and as motivations for action (e.g. Cullinane and Dundon, 2014), and
for framing (Goffman, 1986; Snow and Benford, 1988), to grant legitimacy to actors’
courses of action and to justify their claims (Ainsworth et al., 2014). This article con-
tributes to the ‘ideas matter’ literature by asking, under what conditions can ideas be a
power resource for unions in industrial relations disputes?
On a theoretical level, it analyses the relationship between the ideas used as power
resources in political struggle and the narratives from which these ideas are drawn.
Scholars have long debated the power resources available to organised labour. In
conceptualising the status of labour in capitalism, Wright (2000) distinguishes be-
tween structural power (or the power available to labour due to workers’ location
within the economy) and associational power (which results from workers associating
among themselves). Dörre (2011) elaborates on ideas of institutional power as the re-
sult of political conflict, where institutions ‘fix and to a certain degree legally codify
basic social compromises’ (2011: 21). Much union revitalisation scholarship recog-
nises the diminishing of such power resources, including the decline of collective
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labour’s legitimacy as a political actor (e.g. Preminger, 2018: 105–117), and discusses
ways in which unions can rebuild such power resources through various strategies, in-
cluding efforts to ‘frame’ union struggle (e.g. Frege and Kelly, 2003). Thus, Budd and
Bhave (2008: 92) assert that ‘understanding the industrial relationship, … labour
union strategies, and work-related public policies requires understanding how values
and assumptions form the ideologies and frames of reference used by scholars, prac-
titioners, and policymakers’. In their view, values inform perspectives of unions and
the employment relationship, which then impacts justifications for action (ideology),
as well as enables the evaluation of that action’s effectiveness. However, unions’ use
of ideas as a power resource has only rarely been studied (Ainsworth et al., 2014).
This article, then, also contributes to our understanding of the use of ‘ideational
power’ in union revitalisation. Concurring that context is crucial ‘for the production,
change and maintenance of ideas and beliefs’ (Hauptmeier and Heery, 2014: 2474),
the article investigates the relationship between foregrounded ideas and background
discourses. It shows how context provides rich material with which actors construct
a persuasive discursive understanding of reality that supports their agenda, thus sug-
gesting that ideas can be a powerful resource for political actors when other power re-
sources are diminished.
On an empirical level, the article analyses a labour dispute in the Israeli shipping
line Zim to explore the relationship between the idea of the Zionist nation-state
rooted in a shared historical narrative, and the union’s use of this idea in its struggle
to protect seafaring jobs. Zim had a prominent position in Israel’s history and, as
argued below, was central to the development of the historical narrative of Israel’s
birth and survival. Details of the labour dispute were gathered from court docu-
ments, the media and secondary sources and from interviews with key industry fig-
ures: Avi Levi, chair of the Officers Union (26 July 2015); Shlomo Avitan, former
chair of the Ratings Union (9 Aug. 2015); current and former directors of the Ma-
rine Education and Training Authority, Giora Dash (13 Apr. 2016) and Shay
Meirson (16 Feb. 2015); Amir Basha and Moran Savurai, labour lawyers at Benny
Cohen Law Offices (18 Feb. 2015); Natanel Haiman, director of energy and infra-
structure at the Manufacturers’ Association of Israel (6 April 2016); and Capt. Nim-
rod Keren, formerly of Zim (8 Dec. 2014). For understanding the historical context,
the research drew on documents from the Knesset archives, Israel Corporation doc-
uments and some key personal correspondence provided by interviewees, as well as
secondary sources.
The article first reviews current understandings of ideas and discourse in political
struggle. It then gives historical information about Israel’s national shipping com-
pany and its links with Israel’s state ethos, crucial for understanding this case study.
An account is then presented of restructuring negotiations and the union’s struggle
to compel the Israeli government to retain the state’s ‘Golden Share’ in Zim, by
foregrounding a specific idea of ‘the state’ and its obligations, drawing on Israel’s
national historical narrative. This is followed by a discussion on the significance of
this ‘idea’ in the union’s struggle. To conclude, the article suggests that ideas can
be an important power resource, particularly when other power resources are lack-
ing, but one which is greatly dependent on the specific ideational context: for max-
imum effect, foregrounded ideas should draw on a shared historical narrative, which
enables actors to claim the moral high ground, while accusing their adversaries of
failing to fulfil their moral obligations as understood via the frame of that shared
narrative.
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2 IDEAS AND DISCOURSE IN POLITICAL STRUGGLE
In a rapidly changing context in which the institutionalised certainties of the past can
no longer be relied on, social science research increasingly focuses on the normative
and cognitive ‘meaning structures’ actors use to make sense of the world (Hauptmeier
and Heery, 2014). At the heart of this recent scholarship is the claim that ‘ideas mat-
ter’ (Parsons, 2016): both the background ideational landscape and foregrounded dis-
course impact on actors’ perspectives of society, the decisions actors make and their
normative vision; and this impacts policy and is ultimately reflected in institutions.
For example, scholars have explored how new ideas impact policies, institutions
and governance (Blyth, 2002) and how ideational processes can be ‘discursive
weapons that participate in the construction of reform imperatives’ and bring about
policy change (Béland, 2009: 702) or the ways ideas engender new perceptions of
how the economy works (Hall, 1989).
After a long period of neglect, the role of such ‘meaning structures’ is coming under
scrutiny in industrial relations too.1 Thus, for example Frege (2005) aims to ‘highlight
the relevance of discourse and ideas in the field of comparative industrial relations’
(2005: 152), suggesting that explanations for national variation in forms of industrial
democracy have missed an important variable: ‘the different ideational foundations
or discourses of [industrial democracy] which are embedded in specific national polit-
ical traditions’ (2005: 151–152). Actors, she asserts, have very different perceptions on
what industrial democracy is, ‘embedded in the historical context of how nations
discussed and defined the relationship between firm, state and society’ (2005: 152).
At a similarly high level of analysis, McLaughlin and Wright (2018) investigate the
role of ideas to explain industrial relations policy liberalisation and differences be-
tween countries all categorised as liberal market economies. Importantly, they ac-
knowledge ideational struggle and actors’ agency, demonstrating that ‘the agency
of industrial relations actors seeking to marshal different ideas are important factors’
explaining policy differences (2018: 570).
At a meso level, ideas have been linked to union identity. Scholars have looked at
how the embeddedness of a union in society and the national context affects its ideol-
ogies (e.g. Hyman, 2001) and what is ‘permitted’ or condoned, and they have shown
how these ideologies affect union strategies (e.g. Benassi and Vlandas, 2016; Hodder
and Edwards, 2015). Piore and Safford (2006) suggest that social identities and cul-
tures outside the workplace are gaining salience over class or occupational identity;
in other words, our idea of ‘who we are’ is changing. This, they assert, is reflected
in a shift of axes of mobilisation, which impacts regimes of workplace governance.
Thus, the changing governance regime reflects a ‘fundamental shift in our under-
standing of the nature of industrial society’ (Piore and Safford, 2006: 300).
Similarly, at an organisational level, Greer and Hauptmeier (2012) investigate
union identity but focus on agency. They show how in a context of transnational
union action, in the absence of institutional imperatives to collective action, the union
framed interests and problems to create shared norms and goals. This ‘identity work’
thus created a transnational collective identity over local or national identities. This
identity motivated collective action and strengthened social ties, engendering solidar-
ity even when material interests were not clearly aligned.
1As reflected in the recent call (Feb. 2020) for a special issue of Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy
and Society, ‘Ideas in employment relations research’.
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Hauptmeier (2012) also investigates changing actor ideologies as an explanation
for changes in employment relations at a firm level even as national employment re-
lations institutions remain unchanged. He notes (Hauptmeier, 2012: 738), ‘institu-
tions provide actors with rights and resources, and shape processes of employment
relations, but this still provides actors with ample room to develop new employment
relations practices’. But these practices also alter ‘the functioning and meaning of in-
stitutions’; thus, ‘to an important degree, institutions are what actors make of them…
actors with varying ideologies play an important role in the social construction of in-
stitutions’ (Hauptmeier, 2012: 738).
Discursive institutionalism is an attempt to theorise the use of ideas
(Schmidt, 2008, 2010). This ‘new institutionalism’ developed to fill a gap in institu-
tionalism theory that was better at explaining continuity than change. Scholars in this
‘new institutionalism’ take discourse and ideas seriously as explanations for change
(Schmidt, 2010: 2). This approach is ‘also about the institutional context in which
and through which ideas are communicated via discourse’: these institutions are ‘si-
multaneously constraining structures and enabling constructs of meaning’ for sentient
agents ‘whose “background ideational capabilities” explain how they create and
maintain institutions at the same time that their “foreground discursive abilities” en-
able them to communicate critically about those institutions’ (Schmidt, 2010: 4). Ho-
gan and O’Rourke (2015), for example, build on discursive institutionalism to show
how ideational change is crucial for significant policy change, while
Stringfellow (2018) uses discursive institutionalism to analyse how an idea (diversity
management) has an impact at an institutional level (affecting national models of
integration).
Such studies would suggest ideas are powerful. Carstensen and Schmidt (2016) de-
velop this notion in their concept of ‘ideational power’, which aims to theorise how
agents promote certain ideas at the expense of others. They define ideational power
as ‘the capacity of actors (whether individual or collective) to influence actors’ norma-
tive and cognitive beliefs through the use of ideational elements’ (Carstensen and
Schmidt, 2016: 320). Thus, they differentiate power from mere causality and from
the general claim that ‘ideas matter’, while clearly linking it to agency. However, they
also acknowledge that agents are ‘dependent on existing ideational structures to de-
velop, defend and communicate their ideas’ (Carstensen and Schmidt, 2016: 323).
This is a concept of ideas as a resource, as something ‘out there’ that can be used to
persuade other agents to understand an issue in a certain way and influence ‘common
knowledge’ (Carstensen and Schmidt, 2016: 325).
Accordingly, Foster et al. (2017) show how ‘historical narratives are appropriated,
mobilised and used, in the present, by managers and organisations’ (2017: 1176) as a
strategic resource as opposed to history being merely ‘something that happened’. Sim-
ilarly, Kinderman (2017) argues discourse is a power resource used by neoliberal
think-tanks and employers to impact institutional arrangements. At the level of polit-
ical struggle, Ainsworth et al. (2014) show how ‘the mobilization of certain discourses
can be used to frame issues and develop agendas’ and ‘thus contribute to the effective-
ness of trade unions as political actors’ (2014: 2511), while Dean (2012) shows the
union’s use of discourse to make its members appear ‘worthy’ of collective struggle.
In other words, the potential of ideas is not just how actors make sense of their en-
vironment, or how the ‘ideational landscape’ affects the development of institutions,
but also how actors draw on collective understandings to make a case for their own
agenda. Therefore, this article focuses on a union’s use of these collective
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understandings to explore the conditions under which ‘ideational power’ can be an ef-
fective power resource in industrial relations struggle. Specifically, it looks at the link
between foregrounded ideas and background ideational capabilities or the shared dis-
courses and narratives, and how political actors can use ideas when other power re-
sources are diminished.
3 ZIM AND THE STATE: THE IDEATIONAL BACKGROUND
To understand the significance of ideas in this labour dispute, it is crucial to under-
stand the historical status of Zim as Israel’s national shipping company, whose his-
tory and identity are entwined with those of the country. The strong, centralised
state was directly involved in developing a strong, centralised shipping industry, with
Zim’s ‘national’ character stemming from the way it was developed as a national pri-
ority for the newly established state, infused with the pride of collective ownership
(Ra’anan, 2003). In fact, the need for a strong shipping industry was perceived even
before the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, and Zim itself was founded
using public funds in 1945 (Ra’anan, 2003: 112–113). Major Zionist settlement orga-
nisations were involved (Rosenstein and Sapir, 1980: 3–5), and the fledgling industry
was lauded as crucial for the security and glory of the future Jewish homeland (Co-
hen-Hattab, 2015; Goldberg et al., 1976: 83). After 1948, the government developed
Zim using reparations from Germany (Ra’anan, 2003: 115). Thus, Zim grew rapidly,
basking in the glory of being a state-owned company in a country where the idea of
the ‘Jewish state’ was central to identity and culture.
However, from the 1970s, Israel began a process of decentralisation of power,
liberalisation and privatisation (Katz and Zahori, 2002). The influence of a
neoliberalising United States was notable, particularly since 1985 and the Emergency
Economic Stabilisation Plan, as well as the increasing power of the economic elites in
shaping Israel’s economy in their own interests. At the same time, the
socialist-inclined political camp was weakened, especially since the fall of the Soviet
Union (e.g. Ram, 2008; Shafir and Peled, 2000; see Krampf, 2018, for an overview).
These developments and the political leadership that emerged changed the relation-
ship between the state and other areas of political and civil life: the state stepped back
as economic entrepreneur and shed its responsibility for production and welfare
(Ajzenstadt and Rosenhek, 2000), retreating from direct management of many areas
of public service (Levi-Faur, 2000). The state also ‘withdrew’ in another sense, taking
less direct care of citizens and shifting risk and responsibility to individuals (e.g.
Peled, 2007). The idea of Israel as a collective enterprise was thus greatly undermined.
As the government transformed its modes of intervention in the economy, it also
withdrew from direct management of Zim and gradually privatised it. The first sign
of change came in 1969, when the Knesset established a holding company,
part-owned by the State of Israel, which would attract foreign currency and ‘unbur-
den the state from having to invest huge capital’ of its own, as the then-deputy finance
minister said (Knesset, 1969). This was a ground-breaking idea for Israel at that time,
the first crack in the government-directed closed economy funded by contributions,
loans and reparations. In essence, this was a kind of foreign direct investment but with
some differences. First, the company, known as the Israel Corporation, was intended
to attract specifically Jewish investors in the belief that they would have a strong com-
mitment to the idea of a new ‘Jewish state’. Second, it offered particularly good terms
to investors, to support this national idea with economic incentives. To ensure its
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attractiveness, the company’s portfolio of holdings included part ownership of presti-
gious Israeli public companies, including Zim (48.9 per cent).2
The 1970s, 1980s and 1990s saw Zim become one of the most prominent shipping
companies in the world, joining the top 20 largest carriers by the late 1970s—a posi-
tion it still retains.3 However, it also underwent changes similar to those in other ship-
ping companies—particularly those connected with ‘out-flagging’, when a vessel is
registered in another country in order to circumvent regulations of its home country
(see Lillie, 2005). In most cases, one principal result has been the reduction of national
crews and the increase in foreign crews. By 1973, 34 per cent of Zim-owned vessels
carried foreign flags, up from 4 per cent in 1962 (Goldberg et al., 1976: 83).4
The issue of the country’s interests in a national shipping company remained. For
example, in 1985, the Economic Affairs Committee chairperson declared, ‘I have no
doubt that we need a national [shipping] company and that we need to support it’
(Knesset, 1985). However, the idea of the state as overarching director of affairs
was changing, and the government believed Israeli crew numbers must be reduced
to reduce costs (Meirson, Keren, Avitan, interviews).
In the mid-1990s, the government negotiated a ‘Golden Share’: a share held by the
State of Israel, which specified that Zim would remain an Israeli-registered company
with a certain minimum shipping capacity including a minimum number of
Israeli-flagged vessels that the state can commandeer in emergencies. The finance
and transport ministers hold the Golden Share in trust for the state (Finance Minis-
try, 1995).5 But according to the Officers Union, the Golden Share is not just about
vessels; it also has a knock-on effect, providing jobs for Israeli officers and thus also
experienced seafarers able to fill shore-based jobs such as pilots, harbour masters
and tugboat operators (Dash, Levi, interviews; High Court, 2014: 8).
By the new millennium, things had changed completely, and ministers were consid-
ering the sale of Israel’s remaining shares in Zim. In debates in the State Control
Committee, the Accountant General noted approvingly that privatisation’s main
aim was to take control out of state hands (Knesset, 2000b); Economic Affairs Com-
mittee members noted that the state was not good at management (though in fact
government representatives had no active management role in Zim) and that the gov-
ernment should be enabled to make the sale. The committee chair said, ‘I think the
Economic Affairs Committee’s role is to enable the market to function as freely as
possible in the economic field, and with as few fetters as possible’. The Government
Companies Authority chief repeatedly noted that the state, as shareholder, was
thwarting Zim’s development (Knesset, 2004).
This is not to say the state’s interests in a national carrier were completely forgot-
ten: the Transport Minister said it was important to retain Israeli seafarers and ves-
sels, and the ‘security establishment’ even quantified the state’s needs, talking about
some 11–18 vessels (Knesset, 2004). Indeed, a government decision from 1999 (No.
4797) determined that the industry would continue to be subsidised to retain Israeli
professional knowledge and Israeli vessels, and the Sept. 11 events of 2001 brought
home the need for Israeli vessels when many foreign-owned vessels were instructed
2See the Israel Corporation Law 1969.
3See www.alphaliner.com/top100/.
4It should also be noted that out-flagging has long been considered vital to Israeli shipping in order to en-
able Israeli-owned vessels to dock in countries hostile to Israel (see Rosenstein and Sapir, 1980: 89–90).
5Government Decision 5382.
6 Jonathan Preminger
© 2020 The Authors. Industrial Relations Journal published by Brian Towers (BRITOW) and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
to avoid Israeli ports.6 But as we see from Knesset Finance Committee discussions in
2000, some government members agreed with the CEO of Zim, who asserted that the
Golden Share was archaic, old-fashioned and not suited to today’s reality
(Knesset, 2000a). Zim also claimed the Golden Share had scuppered various attempts
to float the company to raise capital (Knesset, 2004). In 2004, the government sold
Israel’s remaining shares of Zim to the Israel Corporation (which already had half);
nonetheless, the state retained the Golden Share, which was activated following the
sale.
4 DEBT RESTRUCTURING AND THE UNION DISPUTE
In 2008, crisis hit the global shipping industry. Zim, affected like all shipping compa-
nies, had also embarked on an ambitious expansion programme (Rotem Strat-
egy, 2014) and amassed enormous debt (Gabison, 2014e). A debt restructuring deal
negotiated in 2009 proved insufficient, and by 2013, Zim had debts of some $3.2 bil-
lion (Odell and Reed, 2014). Another deal took shape in which creditors would re-
ceive 68 per cent of shares while the holding company (which held 99.7 per cent;
Gabison, 2014c) would inject $200 million in exchange for retaining 32 per cent of
shares (Israel Corporation, 2014c).
The shareholders and creditors agreed to the proposal, but only if the state relin-
quish the Golden Share or significantly alter its terms, which according to Zim would
open the way for the public sale of shares (Gabison, 2014d). Zim argued that either
some $600 million of public funds would have to be injected into the company (which
the government was unwilling to do) or the government would have to accept changes
to the Golden Share, most crucially the reduction of the number of vessels required to
fly the Israeli flag. Otherwise, Zim would go bust (High Court, 2014: 13).
The government indicated that it would accept this proposal, and the Shipping and
Ports Authority, the industry regulator, accepted Zim’s argument.7 However, the Of-
ficers Union saw this as a threat to its members, as it would lead to job loss and even-
tually the end of the Israeli merchant navy officer class. The union is a
semi-autonomous body within the General Federation of Labour (the Histadrut),
with the authority to sign collective agreements for its members. Following a split
in the seafarers’ union between ratings and officers, it represents only officers, and
since the reduction in the number of Israeli ratings to almost zero, it is the only sea-
farers’ union in Israel today and also represents the International Transport Workers’
Federation (ITF) locally. It is run by an elected council of 16 members representing
shore workers too (such as tugboat workers, pilots and vessel inspectors), who then
elect a chair. Since 1995, the chair has been Avi Levi who had been a seafarer since
1969. During his long tenure as chair, Levi has amassed considerable power and con-
tacts within the political establishment: union decisions, many interviewees noted, are
basically Levi’s decisions.
The union petitioned the High Court, claiming that the ministers holding the
Golden Share in trust have no authority to relinquish it, and the union emphasised
its national, sovereign importance. According to the lawyers involved, throughout
the dispute, the union chair emphasised the public agenda, convinced it would benefit
6See letter from MK Nahum Langental to the transport minister, 15 Oct. 2001.
7See letter from Shipping and Ports Authority director Yigal Maor to Capt. Alex Gerson, dated 21 Jan.
2014.
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union members and perceived the union’s role in terms of a broader public benefit and
solidarity (Basha, Savurai, interviews). In Finance Committee minutes, it is notable
that the union chair repeatedly brings up the issue of the Golden Share and the ‘state’s
interests’, while government representatives talk mainly about debt and loss of invest-
ment (Knesset, 2014). In the High Court case, the union claimed that state efforts to
retain an Israeli shipping industry and Israeli officers would be lost ‘in the absence of
a basis for a marine officer class through a shipping company with clear links to Is-
rael’, and this absence is what ‘the sovereign tried to avoid by means of the Golden
Share’ (High Court, 2014: 9). At this time, Zim employed some 1000 Israelis directly
(officers) and another 1200 indirectly, through various related activities. The union
asserted that relinquishing or changing the Golden Share could void a raft of legisla-
tion intended to nurture sustainable Israeli shipping and feared that such change ‘may
be done for business reasons’, which are irrelevant to the ‘state’s vital interests’ (High
Court, 2014: 7). Indeed, the union said that the Golden Share is a kind of ‘insurance
policy’ for Israeli shipping, whose continuation is a ‘national and public interest of the
highest order’ (High Court, 2014: 9); ‘the debt restructuring … does not justify harm
to the public interest anchored in the Golden Share’ (High Court, 2014: 11).
In its struggle to promote its own agenda, the union concentrated on security: as the
union head put it, ‘The need for Israeli officers is an existential, strategic need, it’s not
just to create jobs. Everyone knows that in times of emergency, foreigners [i.e.
non-Israeli seafarers] won’t come’ (Levi, interview). As noted, the shadow of Israel’s
geopolitical isolation and reliance on shipping has accompanied Zim from the begin-
ning. In the Goldberg et al. (1976: 31) report, the Defence Ministry notes the need for
national carriers and Israeli seafarers. The need for Israeli seafarers was emphasised
by the director of the Marine Education and Training Authority too: ‘The seafarers’
market is the most important market in times of emergency. You want it to function
during emergencies. And for this you can rely only on Israelis’ (Dash, interview). To-
day, some 98 per cent of imports and exports pass through Israel’s seaports (High
Court, 2014: 7). Towards the end of the 2006 conflict in Lebanon, by some accounts,
Israel was running low on aircraft fuel because foreign-flagged tankers had kept away
(Basha, Levi, Meirson, interviews). Two years later, Israel went to war in the Gaza
Strip, and again shipping was seriously disrupted. But while there is agreement among
state authorities over Israel’s need for reliable shipping, there is no agreement over
whether the Golden Share is necessary. For example, while an influential economist
spoke out in favour (Barkat, 2014), the Manufacturers Association of Israel tends
to prefer chartering (Haiman, interview). The head of the Training Authority agreed:
‘Getting hold of a ship is relatively easy, it’s just a question of money. Pay and they’ll
charter you a vessel, even if you pay 10 times the market price, but there’ll be a vessel’
(Dash, interview). Indeed, after the 2006 war, the government agreed there should be
at least one tanker and two coal ships under Israeli flags, and hence with Israeli crew,
but instead of including this within the framework of Zim’s obligations to the state, a
different shipping company won a tender to provide the vessels (Meirson, interview).
The union’s approach succeeded in influencing the terms of the debate. While the
High Court refused to rule on the dispute, saying it saw no reason why a union should
be guardian of ‘state interests’, it nonetheless demanded that the state explain, as the
union had demanded, why it appeared willing to accede to Zim’s terms (Haifa Dis-
trict Court, 2014). The Israel Corporation took the case to Haifa District Court, sit-
ting as a liquidation court, and asked the court to change the Golden Share’s terms.
Meanwhile, the debates became wider and louder, bringing in more parliament
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members who framed the discussion in terms of the national need for the Golden
Share (Bior, 2014; Zarhiya, 2014). It appeared that the government would change
its position and demand that the Golden Share be retained. Only the Defence Minis-
try seemed uncertain of the need for the Golden Share, and this of course was a cru-
cial voice (Haiman, interview). So the union recruited a well-respected military figure,
former head of the National Security Council and former senior research associate at
the Institute for National Security Studies, to persuade the Defence Ministry (Basha,
Levi, interviews). The union also persuaded the head of the Knesset Foreign Affairs
and Defence committee of the importance of the issue, and he convened an urgent
committee meeting to debate the issue (Levi, interview).
The result was a Finance Ministry declaration that the Golden Share is in the
‘state’s vital strategic, security and economic interests’ and would be retained.8 The
government submitted its response to Zim, noting, among other things, that the
Golden Share has a ‘sovereign character’ and cannot be annulled as part of insolvency
proceedings (Haifa District Court, 2014: 8). The Haifa court, recognising the risk of
bankruptcy, made minor changes to the Golden Share agreement, which the union
was able to accept (Haifa District Court, 2014: 11–14; Levi, interview). From the
union’s perspective, the dispute was settled.
However, the government feared a precedent enabling the lower courts to rule on
issues of national importance, and took the case to the Supreme Court, claiming
the Haifa Court had no authority to change the Golden Share terms (Dupin, 2014;
Israel Corporation, 2014b). It insisted that the Golden Share is a regulatory tool with
a sovereign character, not a corporate tool, and cannot be annulled by corporate
means (Gabison, 2014a, 2014b). The Supreme Court agreed, and under its tutelage,
the sides reached a compromise agreement (not significantly different from the lower
court’s ruling; Israel Corporation, 2014a).9
5 DISCUSSION: INVOKING THE ZIONIST SECURITY STATE
To summarise, the state built up the shipping industry and controlled it for its own
perceived needs and then stepped back and relinquished its grip. This process marks
the gradual disconnection between Zim and the state, and the increasing management
of Zim outside the reference points of Zionist solidarity. The state aimed to create a
perfectively competitive shipping industry untrammelled by the national responsibil-
ities embodied in its earlier relation with Zim and anchored in the Golden Share.
The union, however, feared catastrophic job losses. Perceived as one of the
‘privileged’ organised worker groups whose legitimacy is questioned by the public
and government (Preminger, 2018: 105–117), the union invoked an older idea of the
Zionist state to alter government intentions and promote its own interests as part of
a strategy of reduced conflict based on renewed partnership with the state. Once the
union had achieved basic protection of Israeli seafaring jobs through the lower court’s
decision, it was satisfied; it was the government that took the case back to the High
Court, acting contrary to its earlier willingness to relinquish the Golden Share. In
8Finance Ministry, press release, 19 June 2014.
9The importance of the agreement is that it brings authority to decide on sovereign matters back into the
Supreme Court and the Government Companies Authority, annulling the precedent that the lower court
could decide on such issues and clearly marking the dispute as a sovereign issue (Barkat, 2014;
Wackett, 2014).
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other words, the union invoked the idea of the historical Zionist state, to promote the
interests of its members, and this provoked the government and upper court into
reasserting the importance of the Golden Share as a sovereign tool. Thus, the older
idea of the state re-emerged as something larger than merely government, larger than
the interests and wishes of specific government ministers.
With this strategy, the union drew on an idea of a sovereign Jewish public, con-
ceived as having interests in common. In linking its interests to the Jewish collective,
embodied in the idea of the State of Israel, the (weakened) union tried to rehabilitate
itself as somehow representing the public, recreating the idea of common interest
round the Golden Share in order to anchor its agenda within the broader polity. In-
deed, two lawyers involved in representing the union noted the union leader’s percep-
tion of workers as gatekeepers, protecting the public interest (Basha, Savurai,
interviews). But regardless of personal perspective, where unions’ strength has been
diminished and structural sources of organised labour’s power have been undermined
(see Preminger, 2018), asserting union interests in terms of wider public interests is
crucial: in this case, efforts to invoke the Zionist state re-established the union’s link
with the collective common good. Given Israeli labour’s singular history, this linkage
is particularly effective: the union is part of the Histadrut labour federation, which
was historically a national institution (not a labour federation in the regular sense),
whose purpose was originally to assist in establishing the State of Israel, not merely
representing workers (Shalev, 1992). This means the union can draw on a venerated
history of organised labour struggling not merely for workers against ‘capital’, but
for the entire Jewish collective in British Mandatory Palestine and later Israel—that
is, the union can draw on ‘existing ideational structures to develop, defend and com-
municate’ its ideas (Carstensen and Schmidt, 2016: 323). It was the union’s
embeddedness within a particular narrative that gave the union a particular identity
that enabled it to draw on this ideational power (Foster et al., 2017). Facing its
own insignificance, the union protected its members’ interests by reviving an older
narrative of the seafarers’ crucial role in the protection of the modern Jewish collec-
tive—a role framed by the state’s need for security—thus tapping into shared dis-
courses and collective understandings of history (‘historically specific structures of
meaning’;10 Carstensen and Schmidt, 2016: 323), and using history as a strategic re-
source (Foster et al., 2017).
This success has nothing to do with any ‘objective need’ for the Golden Share. In
fact, this regulatory tool may not be fit for its stated purpose. As director of the Ma-
rine Education and Training Authority noted (Dash, interview), the Golden Share
terms can be met without providing the state with substantive shipping capacity. This
reflects the broader problem, which goes beyond the failure of government lawyers in
writing up a loophole-free Golden Share agreement: the Golden Share depends on
state authorities to enforce the substantive terms, and not just the letter, of the agree-
ment. It also depends on a company committed to the state, as the Israel Corporation
was intended to be. A company managed with the ‘state’s interests’ in mind can fulfil
the spirit of the Golden Share agreement, but a privatised company whose connection
with Israel is weak will easily find ways not just to ignore the spirit but also to
10For more on the labour movement’s crucial role in Israel’s history, and the place of Palestinians and later
Israeli Palestinian citizens in this movement, see Shalev (1992), Shafir and Peled (2002) and
Preminger (2018).
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circumvent the letter of the agreement. And after the debt restructuring agreement of
2014, Zim has an even weaker connection to Israel, because its shares are now divided
among various creditors around the world.
Nonetheless, in geopolitical terms, Israel sees itself as vulnerable. On a political
level, this view is very powerful, still able to unite (the vast majority of) its Jewish cit-
izens. Moreover, security concerns have shaped the country’s development from the
beginning (Levi-Faur, 1999) and, as noted above, were instrumental in developing
Zim. Given the dominance of military issues in Israeli society (Kimmerling, 1993),
this appeal to security has enormous historical resonance.11 This perspective is com-
pelling also in neoliberal terms, when safeguarding ‘national security’ is the most im-
portant role the government still carries out through direct intervention—the
neoliberal security state (see, e.g. Lea and Hallsworth, 2012). The union was able to
make a strong case that in safeguarding the Golden Share, its members were fulfilling
their duties to the security of the collective: it successfully carried out ‘identity work’
(Greer and Hauptmeier, 2012) in the sense of framing seafarers’ identity within the
broader state-security narrative. Importantly, this was not the development of an
identity to foster internal solidarity or solidarity with allied groups, but in order to an-
chor the union within a value-laden narrative, to strengthen its position in promoting
an agenda in the political sphere.
The appeal to security draws on a collective ethnonational discourse (Shafir and
Peled, 2002), which prioritises the Jewish people, the Jewish state and the Zionist nar-
rative of national resurgence, implicitly rejecting the discourse of economic
liberalisation. Thus, the appeal to security, via this ethnonational discourse, also taps
into popular protest against the new, managerial state perceived as failing in caring
for its citizens (Peled, 2007), a perception that lay behind the wave of social protest
in 2011 (Rosenhek and Shalev, 2013). Indeed, Zim’s debt restructuring negotiations
were often portrayed in the media as another instance of ‘we’ the public paying the
debts of the ‘tycoons’ following a spate of such debt write-offs and the general loath-
ing of such tycoons (e.g. Levy-Weinrib, 2011; Zarhiya, 2011). As seen in Israel’s social
protest movement of 2011, there is still faith that the government can do something
and can wield state resources for the benefit of ‘the people’. So the union’s use of this
discourse is an attempt to hold the government to account, to demand the state fulfil
the promise of the idea of the Zionist state and accept once more its obligation of ‘en-
suring social cohesion and solidarity’ (Soysal, 2012: 4). It is an appeal to the ‘norms
and principles of public life’ to demonstrate the appropriateness of the union’s per-
spective ‘in terms of the values of a given community’ (Carstensen and Schmidt, 2016:
324).
This case shows the way ‘foreground ideas’ (Hauptmeier and Heery, 2014: 2475)
are linked to, and heavily dependent on, the historical background (ideational land-
scape). In other words, it underlines the importance of wider narratives and collective
understandings in ‘empowering’ specific ideational resources. It also shows how
shared narratives infuse these ideas with moral significance. By reclaiming its place
within the narrative, the union was able to claim the moral high ground, holding gov-
ernment authority to account. The union did not change overall policy trends of state
retrenchment and liberalisation, but it did change the government’s stance on a key
11‘National security’ has been invoked in other cases too, as a way of influencing policy (see, e.g. Cohen
and Naor, 2013).
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issue that enabled the union to protect its members’ perceived interests. The case thus
shows how ‘the mobilization of certain discourses can be used to frame issues and de-
velop agendas’ and ‘thus contribute to the effectiveness of trade unions as political ac-
tors’ (Ainsworth et al., 2014: 2511), even when other power resources—specifically
‘classic’ sources of union strength (Dörre, 2011; Wright, 2000)—are lacking. While
the importance of identity and legitimacy for unions and labour struggles has long
been recognised, this is a more focused use of ideational power, as a particular
weapon in the union’s much-depleted arsenal.
6 CONCLUSION
This article has highlighted the importance of ‘ideas’ as explanations of, or at least
significant contributors to, success in labour struggles. It has shown when ‘ideas mat-
ter’ (Hauptmeier and Heery, 2014: 2474) by investigating how unions can use ideas as
a power resource, particularly when other power resources are lacking. Via a case
analysis of a social group whose strength has been inexorably undermined, both spe-
cifically (seafarers in a globalised industry) and generally (organised labour), it sug-
gests that ideational power was a crucial element in the union’s success.
The normative aspect of the idea (holding the state/government to account)
overshadowed other perspectives to gain traction in a way that promoted the interests
of the group that was promoting the idea. The union also circumvented the issue of
conflict with the employer by emphasising its work through political channels such
as the Knesset committees and links with the military. This case, then, would suggest
that this use of ideational power is effective for revitalisation strategies that focus on
rebuilding wider union legitimacy, shifting the focus away from industrial relations
dispute: by weaving itself into official state narratives, the union reduced public hos-
tility to what is commonly perceived as ‘privileged’ organised labour
(Preminger, 2018: 105–117). At the same time, it shifted policy in its favour by
highlighting the mismatch between government action and popular understandings
of the state’s role. It must be noted that the state is not a monolith—certain military
figures, some officials in the Transport Ministry and some in the State Advocacy Of-
fice were supportive of the union’s approach (Basha, Savurai, interviews). The state
also continues to support officer training. So the union tapped into a narrative already
extant among state representatives but no longer dominant.
Historicity must be emphasised: context is crucial as a source of ideas and as
constraining what can be done with them. In the Israeli context, security is the ulti-
mate framing that ‘structure[s] and delineate[s] the contours of public discourse’
(Hauptmeier and Heery, 2014: 2478; Kimmerling, 1993). At the same time, the idea
of the Zionist state, its purpose and obligations, is itself the result of, or shaped by,
the ways it is invoked by political actors: background ideas are ‘constantly evolving
malleable structures subject to continual reconstructions’ (Carstensen and
Schmidt, 2016: 329). In other words, the way an idea is used in day-to-day politics will
also shape this idea, affecting the way it might be used by others in the future, as well
as influencing which groups choose to use it.
To conclude, exploring the relationship between foregrounded discourse and power
through ideas, and background ideational landscape, or power in ideas (Carstensen
and Schmidt, 2016: 329), the article showed how, in the absence of other power re-
sources, ideas can be powerful tools when they link to a shared historical narrative:
this enables actors to claim the moral high ground, while accusing their adversaries
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of failing to fulfil their moral obligations as understood via the frame of that shared
historical narrative.
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